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FINAL EXAMINATION

CONTRACTS
', <f

JANUARY 21, 1961

1. pts daughter ~s engaged to marrY-DIs son. P and D orally promised each other
that each would ~ve the couple $5,000 when the marriage took place. After the
ceremony p gave the newly married coup,le $5,000, but D refused to keep his promise.
P sued D for damages f or breach of contract. tfuich of the analyses listed below
is the best? Give reasons for your c1:1oice.
(a) P cannot recover from D in most American jurisdictions because the son and
daughter were already under a duty to '; keep their promises to each other.
(b) P cannot recover from D on the ~ contract, but he can in quasi contract, as
otherwise D would be unjustly enriche4 at pIs exoense.
(c) P cannot recover from D becaus$ under the· statute of frauds oral contracts
made in consideration of marriage are unenforceable.
(d) . Some other analysis.
:
2. L leased certain premises to T for four years : T operated a restaurant thereon
which was quite profitable.. SL"t: months before the lease was to expire T asked for
an option for another four years, and wrote, "If you will give me such an option,
and if I take it up, I will put $10,000 worth of improvements on the land. II L
wrote back, "I'll give you t.he opt.ion i.£ you w:i.sh it .. but let rna know def'inite1.y

whether you want to exercise it or not within thirty days." T then consulted an
architect with reference to the proposed improvements, and the architect drew
up plans for which he charged T $ 200. L died unexpectedly before the thirty days
were up. L ' s successors in interest refused to give T the four year extension when
T notified them within the thirty day period that he was exercising the option.
Has T a cause of action for breach of contract? Give reasons.

3. D was a star college football player. The P club made a written offer to him
worded as follows: "In consideration of D playing for the P club, the P club
promises to pay D $30,000 for his first year with it, and to give D a $3,000 bonus
upon his signing this contract which is, however, subject to the approval of Commissioner C." D Signed the writing in a place desi~nated, and so did the proper
officer of the P club. He also received the ~~3,OOO bonus. But before Commissioner
C had approved or disapproved of the contract ("contract"), the X club offered D
the same type of work at a salary of $40,000 and a ·~)5, 000 bonus. D then signed
with the X club over which Commissioner C had no authority. A day after Commissioner C learned that D had signed with the X club, Commissioner C formally
approved the contract ("contract"). The P club then sought to enjoin D from playing for any other club in breach of D'S promise to play for it. D contends that
he was never under any contract with the P club. Is his contention sound? Give
reasons.

4. H and W were husband and wife. Their only asset

was their home which they
owned together. Under the laws of the state in which they lived only creditors
owed by H and W jointly could subject the home to their debts and the procedure
in such cases was for the creditor to sue Hand lv jointly, obtain a joint judgment, and then file a bill in equity to enforce the statutory lien of their judgment against the home. 1:1 was taken to a maternity hospital, but due to complications, both mother and child would have died but for expert care over a period of
some months. H borrowed $1,000 from his friend, P, to help pay expenses, and gave
his note to P for that amount. After W had recovered her health, P requested ~i
to sign the note also which she did.. H and tv have made no effort to repay the
loan. P consults you' as to whether or not he can subject the horne of Hand vJ to
the payment of the note. vJhat would you advise, and why?

5. D wrote P offering him $ 2,000

i f he would drill a 3, 700 ft. ~il well asffi r
specifications. P wrote an acceptance, but added, lIdonlt you think a 3,50~*ell
would be satisfactory?" Not hearing from D, P began l'Tork and drilled a well
3,720 feet deep. It turned out to be a "dry" 1-1811, and D refused to pay anything.
To what extent, i f at all, is D liable? Give reasons.
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6. P agreed to sell and D agreed to buy in a memorandum signed by both:
5,000 gals. Worlhmore 110tor Oil SAE 10-70 Base @ 21 cents to 31 cents per gal ..
4,000 lbs. Black Devil Trans. Librucant @ 5¢ per lb.
The technical term SAE 10-70 signifies seven weights of oil 10, 20, 30, 40,
and 70. The 10 weight was to be paid for at the rate of 21 cents per gallon and the 70 weight at 31 cents perglllon. Intermediate weights were to be
paid for proportionally.. Buyer had the right to distribute the 5,000 gallons
among these different weights in units of not less than 100 gallons.. Buyer repudiated the agreeme.n t. What, if any, are the sellerls rights? Give reasons.

50, 60,

7. D purchased a house for a residence for himself through P, a real estate agent.
He then told P that he had a house he would like to sell, and described it. P
then got D to sign a form which gave P an exclusive agency for the sale of the
house for 90 days. It also provided for a 5 per cent commission if the house was
sold during the 90 day period by P, or by D, or by anyone else. The amount for
which the house was to be sold, and the terms on 1vhich it was to be sold were
also specified. P advertised the property and took prospective buyers to see it.
But, at that time, T, a tenant, was in possession and T "knocked" the house when
people came to see it. P told D about this and D said that T was getting out in
ten days and for him to hold up until D got out. He then added that he was not
too pleased with the residence P had sold him, and that he might want to move
into the place himself.. A short time thereafter, and within the 90 days, another
real estate agent, A, with whom D had also listed the property, sold the place to
x. P then claimed that D owed him 5 percent of the price for which A had sold the
place to X. Is this contention sound? Give reasons.
8. D offered in writing to sell P a certain quantity of goods for $2,000. In
this writing he stated that the offer was to be open twelve days from date of the
letter and that the offer was not subject to countermand. Prices suddenly rose,
and on the sixth day, D orally told P, that in vie't>1 of the unexpected changes in
prices, he would have to withdraw the offer. P remonstrated, and then accepted
the offer. Is there a contract? Give reasons ..
9. S was surety on a $1,000 bond owed by P.D. (principal debtor). The bond was
past due and P.D. was unable to pay it. T, who was interested in protecting
the integrity of P.D., told S that i f he, S, 1..J'ould pay the obligation promptly,
T would reimburse S i f P.D. failed to do so within three months. In reliance
Upon this promise S paid the obligation. P.D.ls financial affairs went. from b~d
to worse and he secured a discharge in bankruptcy. T refused to keep h1s prom1se.
What, if any, are Sis rights against T?

10. A contracted for Bfs services for one year.

B left Als service without
justification reasonably supposing that A could get an effici~nt substi~ute. In
fact A was unable to poet a substitute; and a half completed Job was ruJ.ned, at
a lo~s to A of $3,000. For how much, if anything, is B liable? Give reasons.
0

SUGGESTED ANSWERS
CONTRACTs
January 21,1961.
1. Analysis A is wrong because P and D are ~9ntracting with each other and not with
the son and daughter.
<
Analysis B is wrong because one cannot re66ver on an implied contract when the
matter is covered by an express one. Beside~L D has not been enriched at pts expense.
Analysis C is wrong because the contract between P and D is not in consideration
')f marriage but i? conside:ation of the mutu~l promises of P and D. Marriage of the
son and datlghter 1S a condilion--not the consideration.
P and D made a binding bilateral contract; D failed to perform. Therefore P has a
c~use of action against him for at least nominal damages. The son and daughter could
glve P a power of attorney to sue for them,ttpo, if they so desired on whatever terms
might be agreeable.
;
(Section 11 of the Statute of Frauds is i~pplicable as that section only applies
to contracts to sell goods, wares, and merchandise.) (Marriage settlement contracts
are quite common. At common law marriage was said to be the best of all considerations, so such contracts, even when made directly with the engaged parties do not
violate public polley.)
,

2. No. Tasked L to make him an offer (option) • L made the offer which T could accept
or reject until the option expires _ Since L received no consideration for the option
it ceased at L's death. The promises ~o pay four years more rent and to make the
imprO"fements if T accepted the option were not consideration for the optionts remaining open thirty days, but terms of the extended lease i f and when T decided to
tt:ke up the option. The $200 spent by T on plans was not bargained for as consideration for the option. The doctrine o:f promissory estoppel is not applicable because
L could not reasonably foresee that T would make such an expenditure in reliance
upon his gratuitous promise to keep the offer open, nor was ita sufficient change of
position for the doctrine to apply.

3. No. P and D had entered into a valid conditional contract--conditional on the
Ilpproval of a third party. I:f that party approves wi thin a reasonable time both P
and D are bound. If he disapproves or :fails to act P and D are both released. Since

C is an independent third party P' s promise is not illusory. In other words, C' s
disapproval would be a condition subsequent divesting rights rather than CIS
approval being a condition precedent to the existence of any contract at all.
Notel In 186 F.Supp.933(~960)the language was "This agreement shall became valid
am binding upon each party hereto only when, as and if it shall be approved by the
Commissionerlt • Here approval was made an express condition precedent to the existence of any contract and John Robinson was a free agent with the power to change his
~. Under these dircumstances the Commissioner had no power to approve after he
knew that the player had withdrawn his offer. O:f course the player would be under a
duty in such a case to return the bonus as otherwise he would be unjustly enriched.

4.

I would advise P that he could not secure a joint judgment. The money had already
been lent on Hts sole responsibility- Moral consideration is past consideration and
"water over the dam turns no wheels n • The fact that W benefited is immaterial unless
she received bargained for consideration for her proljlise. Note: In a few jurisdictions Wmight be held jointly liable on one or more of the following theories, (l)W
consented as soon as she was able to consent and presumably would have consented at
the time the loan was made had she been able. Hence there is an implied promise; (2)
It, when H signed the note he had stated that W would sign later, then, when W ~d
Sign, she ratified and bec~e liable; (3) The Uni:form Commercial Code. adopt~ th~ Vl.ew
that a person who signs a negotiable instrument without any new consl.derat10n 1S .
liable thereon on the theory that i f a pre-existing debt can be value fo: a negot1able instrument, a pre-existing debt should equally support a later promJ.~e by a
third party to pay;(4)In some jurisdictions by statute both husband and.W1:fe are
jOintly liable for necessary family ~penses, and in suc:h st~tes an act10n could be
brought on the underlying obligation of which the note 1S eV1dence.

5.

D is liable for $2,000. D made an offer to enter into a unilateral contract which
P accepted. by doing the requested act. pts inqu;l.ry was just that, and not a counter-

2.
offer. D was under no duty to answer and his failure to do so thus had no legal
consequences.
Note: If one stated that the contract was complete at the time P mailed the letter
of acceptance, he should explain why a promise would suffice when an act was requested.
'nle fact that P threw in 20 feet for good measure is immaterial. Of course there
was no agreement to pay for this 20 feet,~r was D damaged in any way •

6. The case from which this question was

.
~en

held that the portion of the contract

with referenoe to the oil was void for ind~finiteness as D could take as much or as

little oil of the different weights as he might wish wi thin the very wide limits of
~e agreement. Hence it would be impossibl~ to fix the damages as the profits varied
nth the grade of oil. The same case also ~eld that the promise to buy the lubricant
was severable, and definite, and hence P c~uld recover damages for breach of this
portion of the agreement.
\
Notel There is respectable authority holding that such agreements are not void tor
indefiniteness and that P can at least recqver the minimum profit he would have made
on what D could have purchased. At any rate the problem of definiteness should have
been discussed.
The fact that P could have sold the oil and lubricant, elsewhere is immaterial as
he is entitled to as many profits as he could make. Hen.~e the doctrine of avoidable
consequences has no application.
I

7. By the weight of modern authority P's contention is sound. D made an offer to
enter into a unilateral contract. P has not promised to do a thing. But after he
starts performance D must give him the agreed time in which to finish. R#45. This
is on a number of theories I (l)D impliedly promised not to revoke in consideration of
pta starting to perform; (2)Promissory estoppel takes the place of consideration for
the implied promise not to revoke:'() )After P started to perform, the contract ntook
on a bilateral aspect"; (4)The contract was really bilateral to start with as both
~ties expected that P would use his best efforts to sell the property, and finding
a buyer is a condition precedent to D's liability under a bilateral contract rather
than the requested act amounting to an acceptance of a uni'lateral one.

8. No. In the absence of statute an offer can be withdrawn before acceptance unless
a consideration,seal,or promissory estoppel deprives the offeror of this power.
A promise without consideration not to countermand the offer is thUS legally inoperative. An offer made in writing may be withdrawn orally.
9. ACCOrding to Williston, the English cases, the Restatement 84(d) ,Corbin, and many
American cases S is liable. Note that this is a case in which a third party offers
something extra and is quite different from the case in which one of the parties to
the contract makes such an offer. T got the benefit he desired -and benefit to the
~missor to which he was not previously entitled is a sufficient consideration.
Moreover it is not certain that S has not suffered a detriment. The creditor may
have been willing to wait, to forgive the debt, or to compromise the matter. Since
T's promise was made to S who ow..:.ed the creditor and not to. the creditor th~ statute
of frauds is not applicable.
I would have given full credit for the oPposJ.te
answer based on the theory that S was only doing what he w~s already bou~ to do. it
Such answers had indicated that the writers thereof recognJ.zed the theorJ.es mentJ.onad above and said something about the authorities.
10. B is liable only for nominal damages. The special damages were not wi thin the
contemplation of the parties when the contract was made i f one could reasonably

suppose that an efficient substitute could be obtained. Hence no such damages are
r~overable under the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale.
/- . . J Ji"J V
/ 7 '~\ ,-,I '--- i

